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Standard Market Design: Help for Competition
or a Return to Command and Control?
J. Alexander Cooket
Although electricity markets' march toward competition has not been
a complete success, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC") remains committed to easing wholesale electricity markets
toward that goal. Indeed, FERC's Standard Market Design Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking makes some headway: Locational marginal pricing,
for example, will force load to internalize the congestion costs of its
consumption and will signal the need for new transmission and
generation. FERC, however, has embraced price caps in spot markets and,
to make the markets work despite the price caps, has proposed a Resource
Adequacy Requirement ("RAR ") to ensure that adequate generation exists
to deliver electricity to load. If RAR achieves FERC's objective, it will
stunt the growth of demand response, a necessary component of stable
competition. Further, RAR will permit the perpetuation of the current
price-cap regime, which distorts price signals. The claim that RAR
together with price caps are only temporary measures to help put
wholesale markets on surer footing seems misguided; until price caps are
raised significantly above present levels, load-serving entities and load
itself lack the incentive to invest in technologies necessary to make
demand response a reality. If this were not enough to counsel against
promulgating the PAR, the proposal is internally contradictory and,
according to the relevant statutes, lies outside FERC's jurisdiction to
implement or enforce. FERC should discard the RAR and current price
caps and instead adopt a reformist program that will better allow scarcity
spot prices to ensure generation adequacy.
In tro d u ctio n ............................................................................................. 4 3 3
1. The Rationale Behind the Resource Adequacy Requirement .......... 436
A. The Unique Properties of Electricity and Their
Implications for Electricity M arkets ........................................ 436
1. Price Caps and M arket M itigation ................................... 437
2. Insufficiency of Price-Spike Signals ................................ 440
t B.A., University of Virginia, 2000; M.Sc., London School of Economics, 2001; J.D.
Candidate, Yale Law School, 2004. Many thanks to Prot. Alvin Klevorick for providing research
guidance and for critiquing drafts of this Note.
Copyright D 2003 by Yale Journal on Regulation
Yale Journal on Regulation
3. Relation to Capacity Requirements .................................. 441
B . ICAP 's Inadequacies ................................................................ 442
C. FERC's Alternative: A Resource Adequacy
R eq uirem ent ............................................................................. 44 3
I. Im plem entation D iffi culties ............................................................. 444
A . Substantive Problem s ............................................................... 444
1. Tension with Competitive Markets .................................. 444
2. Contradictions Within the RAR Proposal ........................ 448
B . Jurisdictional Problem s ........................................................... 450
1. FERC's Legal Authority (According to FERC) ............... 451
2. FERC's Legal Authority (According to the
U nited States C ode) .......................................................... 452
3. FERC's Legal Authority (According to the Case
L aw ) ................................................................................. 4 5 4
III. A lternatives to R A R ......................................................................... 456
A. Require Call Options for Capacity .......................................... 456
1. Benefits of a Call-Option Regime .................................... 458
2. Shortcomings of a Call-Option Regime ........................... 458
B. Raise Price Caps to the Value of Lost Load ............................ 459
1. S p o t P rices ........................................................................ 4 59
2 . R eserv es ........................................................................... 4 6 3
3. Better Than RAR, But Not First Best .............................. 464
C o n clu sio n ............................................................................................... 4 6 5
Table of Acronyms
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FPA Federal Power Act
ICAP Installed Capacity
ISO Independent System Operator
ISO-NE ISO New England




MMM Market Mitigation Measure
MW Megawatt
MWh Megawatt-hour
NOPR Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NYISO New York ISO
PJM Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection
PURPA Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
RAR Resource Adequacy Requirement
RTP Real-Time Price
SMD Standard Market Design
VOLL Value of Lost Load
Vol. 20:431, 2003
RAR in FERC's Standard Market Design
Introduction
Deregulation has hit upon hard times in the electricity markets. The
public mood has reversed course, shifting from exuberance over the
increased efficiencies deregulation promised to depression induced by the
California meltdown.! The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC"), though, is still attempting to nudge electricity markets toward
competition. It recently released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
("NOPR") 2 outlining a Standard Market Design ("SMD") to which, if it is
eventually promulgated as a rule, electricity markets throughout the
country must conform.3 FERC intends to learn from the errors of
deregulation's past instead of shrinking from the task altogether.
In California, one error among others4 was a shortage of generation
capacity, a factor that arguably contributed to the breakdown in
California's electricity market.5 While generation shortages have given
I See, e.g., Phillip S. Cross, State PUCs Show Split Personality, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 15,
2003, at 10 ("While federal policy-makers push ahead with wholesale market reforms in the electricity
sector, many at the state level now call for a cautious approach to protect consumers."); Timothy P.
Duane, Regulation's Rationale: Learningfrom the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471,
539-40 (2002) (suggesting a return to command-and-control regulation in electricity markets to shield
society from the risks of competitive markets).
2 While most government agencies use the acronym "NPRM" for Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, FERC employs "NOPR" instead.
3 Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and
Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55452 (published Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Remedying Undue Discrimination].
4 Blumstein et al. identify a number of causes for the California market's collapse besides
shortage of generation capacity: "a retail price freeze that prevented supply and demand from
equilibrating, exogenous increases in the prices of some key inputs, poor design of the electricity
market, the exercise of market power by generation owners, and inept regulation." CARL BLUMSTEIN
ET AL., THE HISTORY OF ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN CALIFORNIA 21 (Ctr. for the Study of
Energy Mkts., Working Paper No. 103, 2002).
5 Id. at 22-23 ("During the period 1990 to 2000, load growth in California averaged about
1.2% per year .... After... 1991, capacity additions in California came nearly to a halt during the rest
of the decade."). Joskow & Kahn show that, even after accounting for supply and demand factors
affecting the California crisis, exercise of market power was responsible for a substantial portion of the
price spikes. PAUL JOSKOW & EDWARD KAHN, A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRICING BEHAVIOR IN
CALIFORNIA'S WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET DURING SUMMER 2000 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8157, Mar. 2001) [hereinafter JOSKOW & KAHN, A QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS]; Paul Joskow & Edward Kahn, Identifying the Exercise of Market Power: Refining the
Estimates 1 (July 5, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal on Regulation). But see
Scott M. Harvey & William W. Hogan, Further Analysis of the Exercise of Market Power in the
California Electricity Market ii (Nov. 21, 2001 ) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal on
Regulation) (arguing that claims about withholding such as Joskow & Kahn's are subject to a large
margin of error, since they are based only on public information and not on more accurate proprietary
data).
The FERC Staff, in detailing the causes of California's high electricity prices, "found significant
market manipulation," though "significant supply shortfalls and a fatally flawed market design were
the root causes of the California meltdown." FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON
PRICE MANIPULATION IN WESTERN MARKETS: FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL
MANIPULATION OF ELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS PRICES ESI, FERC Docket No. PA02-2-000 (Mar.
26, 2003), available at http://ferris.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch.asp [hereinafter FINAL
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way to a generation glut in the aggregate,6 there is reason to question the
competitive market's ability to incentivize adequate generation resources
on its own. First, competitive electricity markets are still in their infancy,
and the optimism that led merchant generators to construct excessive
generation capacity in response to projected shortages may give way to
pessimism and too little construction of generation capacity the next time
spot prices rise. In fact, as the economy has sputtered and load7 growth
slowed," merchant generators have already halted construction that was
still in the planning stage; although a generation surplus may exist for
several years in some regions, it will not be as large, widespread, or
prolonged as once thought. 9
Second, the current surplus in generation capacity cannot be wholly
attributed to competitive spot markets for wholesale electricity.
Independent System Operators ("ISOs")' ° in the Northeast run capacity
markets (more specifically, auctions for Installed Capacity)" that
supplement the spot prices generators receive with capacity payments
intended to cover generators' fixed costs that go unrecovered in the spot
market, provided the generators' capacity investments are efficient. In
Installed Capacity ("ICAP") markets, Load-Serving Entities ("LSEs") are
required to contract with enough generation capacity to cover the LSEs'
load plus an additional reserve margin (commonly set at eighteen percent
of load for large utilities)' 2 in advance of delivery (often a month ahead).
The ICAP that generators sell amounts to a pledge to bid a certain amount
of electricity into the spot market at a future date, without specifying the
buyer or the price. The individual LSE receives nothing in return for its
capacity payment, since it still has to enter the spot market to purchase
REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION]. Although the FERC staff has access to proprietary data and
reached conclusions similar to Joskow & Kahn's, Harvey & Hogan's warning about the value of public
information still has some merit: The FERC Staff discovered a connection between manipulations of
natural gas prices and high electricity prices that Joskow & Kahn had overlooked. Compare FINAL
REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION, supra, at ESI-ES2, with JOSKOW & KAHN, A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS, supra, at 30.
6 Gary L. Hunt & Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Is There a Capacity Glut, and How Long Will It
Last?, ELECTRICITY J., Aug.-Sept. 2002, at 63; Steven A. Mitnick, Generation Opportunities Remain
Despite the Withering Attack of Superficial Analysis, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 22.
7 "Load" simply denotes demand for electricity or "a customer that receives power from
the electric system." STEVEN STOFT, POWER SYSTEM ECONOMICS 448 (2002).
8 Hunt & Sioshansi, supra note 6, at 66-67.
9 Id. at71.
10 "An independent system operator is a nonprofit system operator" that schedules
electricity transmission over a geographic area and "also runs a real-time balancing market and usually
a day-ahead market of some type." STOFT, supra note 7, at 447. The three northeast ISOs are ISO New
England ("ISO-NE"), the New York ISO ("NYISO"), and the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland
Interconnection ("PJM").
II Installed Capacity is "[g]enerating capacity that has been operational," though it need not
be operational at present if it is "experiencing a planned or unplanned outage." Id. (emphasis omitted).
12 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 493.
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electricity. 3 The capacity payments a generator receives thus go toward its
fixed costs; total spot market payments, which equal the energy-only price
in the spot market multiplied by the quantity of electricity sold, should
cover at least the generator's variable costs.
To combat uncertainty about the market's provision of generation,
FERC's SMD NOPR proposes a Resource Adequacy Requirement
("RAR") with a goal similar to ICAP's-guaranteeing that enough
generation exists to serve load. RAR, however, is not an attempt simply to
repackage the ISOs' ICAP scheme. FERC intends to remedy shortcomings
in ICAP markets, specifically ICAP's short-term nature and price
volatility.
This Note will demonstrate, though, that RAR will not achieve
FERC's goal of ensuring long-term resource adequacy. Even if it did, the
RAR would undermine SMD's purpose, namely advancing toward a
competitive electricity market, and it should be scrapped if FERC is
serious about capturing the benefits of competition. Part I of the Note sets
forth the rationale for capacity requirements in general and the RAR in
particular. It explains how imperfections and market power in electricity
markets lead some to call for capacity requirements, explores the
characteristics of ICAP markets that FERC finds off-putting, and describes
the RAR proposal. Part II evaluates the RAR from both substantive and
jurisdictional perspectives. It demonstrates the tension between the RAR
and SMD's overall goal as well as RAR's internal contradictions. Part II
also surveys the relevant statutes and case law to see whether FERC has
the power to promulgate the RAR or whether the RAR falls outside
FERC's jurisdiction as an impermissible attempt to regulate generation.
Part III describes alternative means of achieving resource adequacy. Call
options for electricity, if mandated, could ensure long-term resource
adequacy and encourage financial instruments that hedge price spikes. A
superior alternative, however, would be to eliminate capacity requirements
altogether and raise price caps to the value of lost load ("VOLL"),
allowing demand response to discourage exercises of market power. In
short, FERC should abandon the RAR.
13 LSEs can also satisfy the ICAP requirement by contracting for future delivery of
electricity (that is, entering into a forward contract for electricity). In this case, LSEs do receive
something in exchange for their bargain. Such contracting, though, occurs outside the ICAP market.
Yale Journal on Regulation
I. The Rationale Behind the Resource Adequacy Requirement
A. The Unique Properties of Electricity and Their Implications for
Electricity Markets
Electricity's properties constrain electricity markets in distinctive
ways. The physical laws governing electricity flows require that quantity
demanded and supplied always be equal. Otherwise the grid malfunctions,
and blackouts ensue. Ensuring equality of these quantities would be easier
if demand were not highly inelastic. A holdover from the pre-deregulation
era is the absence of real-time pricing;' 4 load pays a flat rate that averages
the cost of electricity over a fixed period. Even if load were charged real-
time prices, those price signals would have to be communicated to users in
a timely fashion, and users' consumption would have to be measured in
real time; the necessary technologies, however, are not installed at present
and would require costly investment on the part of the regulator, load, or
LSEs.15 As a result, load does not respond to high prices at peak hours by
reducing consumption, because it pays the same price for consumption at
peak hours as it does for consumption at any other hour. The consequences
are especially dire if peak load is greater than the supply of electricity,
forcing the ISO to shed load.
Like demand, short-run supply is inelastic. Electricity cannot be
stored, and the fixed costs of capacity are substantial, such that firms do
not retain much excess capacity. 16 Supply expands only through the
construction of new generation, and that takes at least one year to come on
line from start to finish.'"
The equality constraint and the inelasticity of supply and demand
create opportunities for market-power abuses even when no single
generator has a large market share. To exercise market power, a generator
need only be pivotal. If the gap between supply and demand, however
14 Severin Borenstein, Frequently Asked Questions About Implementing Real-Time
Electricity Pricing in California for Summer 2001, at 3 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Yale Journal on Regulation) ("The economics of demand charges made more sense under the old
regulatory regime. The concept was to charge customers for their contribution to the need to build
additional peaking capacity .... This makes much less sense in a deregulated wholesale market where
demand increases result in significant increases in wholesale price even before the system gets right up
to its capacity.").
15 Id. at 5-7 (estimating that operationalizing real-time pricing for California load whose
peak usage is above 200kW would cost $30 million). See also Michael Jaske, Practical Implications of
Dynamic Pricing, in DYNAMIC PRICING, ADVANCED METERING, AND DEMAND RESPONSE IN
ELECTRICITY MARKETS 31, 39-45 (Hewlett Found. Energy Series, Oct. 2002) (describing the various
metering and telecommunications systems required to operationalize demand response).
16 Adam B. Jaffe & Frank A. Felder, Should Electricity Markets Have a Capacity
Requirement? If So, How Should It Be Priced?, ELECTRICITY J., Dec. 1996, at 55.
17 Frank A. Felder, "An Island of Technicality in a Sea of Discretion ": A Critique of
Existing Electric Power Systems Reliability Analysis and Policy, ELECTRICITY J., Apr. 2001, at 28.
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small, cannot be filled without a particular generator, that generator can
bid far above marginal cost and still be paid its bid, if not more. Its bid
becomes the market-clearing price if no other generator submits a higher
bid that is accepted.18 Since demand does not respond by decreasing
consumption and since supply cannot expand for a time, a pivotal
generator can reap monopoly profits. Withholding can perform the same
trick. Generators take a small amount of generation offline or, for part of
their capacity, submit bids high enough that they will never be accepted.
Once a generator becomes pivotal, either through its own or other
generators' withholding, it can force the market-clearing price to a level
that at the very least permits recovery of the opportunity cost of the
generation withheld.
1. Price Caps and Market Mitigation
Because of demand's inelasticity and the potential for market-power
abuse, FERC and the ISOs have instituted measures aimed at curbing
artificially high spot prices and limiting excessive price volatility. Price
caps decrease generators' incentives to exercise market power and dampen
wide swings in prices. To make economic or physical withholding of
generation worthwhile, generators must increase prices enough to offset
the opportunity cost of keeping some capacity out of the market. Price
caps make this more difficult, since generators will not withhold if the
opportunity cost is greater than the added revenue the price cap permits. 19
Price caps also smooth price spikes by limiting their height. Although
discouraging market-power abuses seems a boon, the benefit from
decreased price fluctuations is less clear.20 The conventional wisdom
appears to conflate volatility and high spot prices, without articulating
costs unique to the former.21 FERC claims that volatility discourages
customers from entering into long-term contracts for electricity and thus
prevents customers from obtaining price certainty.22 FERC's argument
18 This assumes that the market is not pay-as-bid and instead that the highest accepted bid
sets the market price paid to all generators. I do not consider the pay-as-bid case, because FERC
proposes a single market-clearing price regime in its SMD NOPR. Remedying Undue Discrimination,
supra note 3, 204 n.1 18 (proposing a single market-clearing price regime because it encourages
generators to bid at marginal cost and because it incentivizes demand response).
19 STOFT, supra note 7, at 171.
20 Associating price caps with decreased price fluctuations is inaccurate in some
circumstances even if the price caps bind. The variance of spot prices could rise after the introduction
of price caps. If shortages occur more frequently in a price-cap regime, the price may be driven to the
cap sufficiently often to increase the variance in spot prices compared with a price-spike regime. Even
in such a scenario, though, the range of spot prices would still be smaller.
21 See, e.g., Janet Gail Besser et al., The Political Economy of Long-Term Generation
Adequacy: Why an ICAP Mechanism Is Needed as Part of SMD, ELECTRICITY J., Aug.-Sept. 2002, at
54.
22 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 98.
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seems to equate volatility and uncertainty about long-term price trends,
since in the presence of volatility alone customers would be more likely to
enter long-term contracts to secure a single price for electricity.
Because price caps apply regardless of whether price spikes result
from scarcity or from market power, sometimes the caps will suppress
prices' ability to signal the need for more capacity. A common price cap,
for instance, is $1000 per megawatt hour ("MWh"). Even if no market-
power abuses occur, the spot price likely must exceed $1 000/MWh several
times over if generators are to recover their fixed costs in the absence of a
capacity market.
2 3
Besides price caps, ISOs have implemented market mitigation
measures ("MMMs") to combat market-power abuses that occur at prices
below the cap. In theory, these MMMs screen abuses of market power
from price increases due to scarcity and therefore do not suppress scarcity
prices. For example, consider the New York ISO's ("NYISO's") conduct
and impact test. The NYISO compares a generator's bid to reference levels
calculated using that generator's bids from the previous ninety days. When
the current bid exceeds the reference level by the lesser of 300 percent or
23 Report of John J. Boland & Javier lnon on behalf of Dynegy Power Marketing, Inc. at 10,
Remedying Undue Discrimination, FERC Docket No. RMOI-12-000 (Feb. 19, 2003), available at
http://ferris.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch.asp [hereinafter Report of Boland & inon]
(calculating that in the absence of capacity markets a price cap ranging from $16,150/MWh to
$32,000/MWh would be necessary to ensure a loss-of-load probability ("LOLP") of one day in ten
years). Paul Joskow argues that revenues from the spot market in ISO-NE between 1999 and 2002
demonstrate that the spot market will not generate enough scarcity rents to maintain conventional
levels of reliability. Comments of Professor Paul L. Joskow at 28-39, Remedying Undue
Discrimination, FERC Docket No. RMOI-12-000 (Jan. 10, 2003), available at
http://ferris.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch.asp. In contrast to Boland & Inon's position, Joskow
claims that raising the price cap is not a solution, since even the current $1000/MWh cap has hardly
ever been binding; if price caps were causing revenue deficiencies, one would expect spot prices to
reach the cap more often than six hours per year on average. Id. at 34-35.
Although Joskow's evidence lends support to his conclusion about the inadequacy of spot prices
as scarcity signals, it does not prove that Joskow is correct. For one, spot prices between 1999 and
2002 may be signaling a surplus of capacity in New England. Joskow does not believe this is the case,
but he admits that demonstrating so is difficult. 1d. at 37. Second, Joskow's analysis of spot prices does
not account for capacity payments generators received from ISO-NE's ICAP market. Id. at 33-34, 38-
39. While the marginal cost and, equivalently, the competitive price of ICAP are zero when generation
capacity is sufficient to serve load, during a shortage ICAP's competitive price is the levelized cost of
a marginal generation unit. Although spot prices even under shortage conditions may not generate
enough scarcity rents to cover the fixed costs of marginal generation, that result need not reflect a
shortcoming in the spot market but instead would occur because capacity payments from the [CAP
market cover the balance of generators' fixed costs. To prove that spot prices are inappropriate signals,
Joskow would have to show that the existence of a capacity market does not affect the level of spot
prices, and he neither makes nor provides sufficient evidence for such a claim.
Furthermore, Joskow's claim about spot-market revenues is limited to marginal generators,
namely combustion turbines, and does not apply to baseload units. Id. at 34, 36. Combustion turbines
are the costliest units to run. As a result, when the spot price just covers a peaking unit's variable costs,
cheaper baseload units, such as combined-cycle generators, will receive a spot price that exceeds their
variable costs. Joskow's findings do not show that these inframarginal revenues fall short of baseload
units' fixed costs.
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$100/MWh, the NYISO considers mitigation. If a generator is suspected of
engaging in physical rather than economic withholding, then the NYISO
weighs mitigation when the current quantity withheld is greater than the
lesser of ten percent or 100MW of a unit's capability or the lesser of five
percent or 200MW of the generator's capacity across all units. These
thresholds are designed to separate cases of scarcity pricing from exercises
of market power. Even if the thresholds obtain, the NYISO consults with
the generator to seek a competitive justification that would obviate
mitigation of the suspect bids.24 Alternatively, if the thresholds obtain but
the bids have little impact on market-clearing prices, then no mitigation is
applied: 25 If firms cannot profit from increasing their bids or from taking
capacity offline, then they are much less likely to be exercising market
power.
Unlike price caps, the MMMs do not blindly suppress scarcity prices,
since they attempt to distinguish between scarcity-pricing behavior and
market-power abuses. As the NYISO's conduct and impact test shows,
though, discretion plays a large role in separating competitive from non-
competitive pricing;26 the market monitor must decide without the help of
bright-line rules whether bids that surpass the thresholds are competitively
justified or whether those bids impact market-clearing prices. Inevitably
the market monitor will mistakenly identify competitive bidding behavior
as a market-power abuse that must be mitigated or, conversely, will
erroneously permit market-power abuses that are justified to the monitor's
satisfaction.27 Although FERC's SMD NOPR does not explain why FERC
believes that MMMs suppress scarcity prices, 28 FERC is likely worried
about the former category error.29 One other motivation for FERC's
concern may be the transaction costs generators incur when justifying their
bidding behavior to the ISO's market monitor.30 Even if such costs are not
24 Affidavit of David B. Patton, Ph.D. on behalf of the New York Independent System
Operator 17-35, In re New York Independent System Operator, FERC Docket No. ER01-3155-002
(Mar. 20, 2002), available at http://ferris.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch.asp.
25 Id. 36-40.
26 See John Farr & Frank A. Felder, A Critique of Existing Market Performance Monitoring
and Mitigation Policies, ELECTRICITY J., July 2002, at 16 (claiming that the NYISO's balancing test is
"opaque and politically driven").
27 The market monitor would also not detect market-power abuses when the bids involved
do not surpass the thresholds. Such errors, however, are not due to the market monitor and would
probably occur rarely given the low level of the thresholds.
28 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 468.
29 FERC may also be concerned that vigilant market monitoring that would lead to false
positives (finding market-power abuses when they do not occur) more often than false negatives (not
identifying market-power abuses when they occur). Otherwise the revenues generators receive from
market-power abuses that go unnoticed may offset the losses they incur from not always being able to
charge scarcity prices.
30 See Farr & Felder, supra note 26 ("(Tlhe process of mitigating bids in load pockets has
proven time consuming and prone to litigation; the process might best be characterized as a 'miniature
rate case.').
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substantial, their existence will distort generators' bids to some extent. On
the whole, though, MMMs are unlikely to suppress scarcity prices to the
same degree that price caps do.
2. Insufficiency of Price-Spike Signals
Apart from concerns about market power and suppression of scarcity
prices, spot-market prices, according to FERC, would not signal the need
for new generation in time for it to come online." The lag in generation
construction prevents supply from responding quickly to changes in spot-
market prices and thus results in short-run inelasticity of supply.
Given that short-run inelasticity characterizes a number of industries
that require capital equipment with similar lag times, FERC's concern
seems solipsistic. The peculiarities of electricity, however, may justify
FERC's claim. First, in other industries with significant supply-side lags,
demand responds to increased prices, and the market equilibrates. In the
case of electricity, political, economic, and regulatory constraints have
foreclosed implementation of demand response.32 The only solution to a
shortage of electricity is to shed load.33
Second, in other industries, while manufacturers wait for new capital
equipment to come online, they can satisfy demand by importing goods
from regions not experiencing a shortage. For electricity, even when spot
prices reflect scarcity, physical limits on transmission lines may prevent
enough electricity from being imported into areas of high demand to
satisfy load.3 4 (Such areas of high demand that are coupled with binding
transmission constraints on imports are known as "load pockets.") The
only means of satisfying demand in a load pocket is either to build more
transmission lines (which itself involves a lag) or to construct additional
generation within the pocket.
Despite the electricity markets' unique characteristics, FERC's
argument that spot prices will signal shortages too late to prevent them is
not wholly convincing. Merchant generators that do not recognize trends
in spot prices and load growth will forego profits that other generators
more sophisticated in predicting future generation needs will capture.
Perhaps no merchant generator could interpret market trends accurately
31 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 461.
32 See Borenstein, supra note 14; see also Severin Borenstein, The Theory of Demand-Side
Price Incentives, in DYNAMIC PRICING, ADVANCED METERING, AND DEMAND RESPONSE IN
ELECTRICITY MARKETS 5, 29 (Hewlett Found. Energy Series, Oct. 2002).
33 Two types of shortages can exist in electricity markets. A reserve shortage occurs when
the supply of electricity can serve the entire load but is smaller than the load combined with the reserve
margin. An overall shortage exists when the supply of electricity is less than load.
34 Transmission lines have physical limits on the amount of electricity they can carry. When
those limits are binding, the line is "congested."
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due to the infancy of electricity markets and uncertainty about the
regulatory response to them, but that would be a claim about a nascent
industry and not about spot prices per se.35
Further, FERC's concern about the lag in constructing generation
capacity may be somewhat anachronistic. While combustion turbines' lead
time is twelve to eighteen months, they can be dismantled, moved, and
reassembled in approximately six months' time.36 Granted, combined-
cycle generators still require two to three years to construct, and FERC
worries that a market solution to generation adequacy would be biased
against such lower-cost generation because of its longer lead time.
37
Mobile combustion turbines, though, might be a viable market solution.
Even after the turbines are moved to a site needing generation, merchant
generators would still build combined-cycle generators, both to realize cost
efficiencies and to make the turbines available to areas that will experience
future shortages.38
3. Relation to Capacity Requirements
The conventional response to the problems posed by suppressed
scarcity prices, a lack of demand response, and the long lead times in
generation construction is to impose a capacity requirement in conjunction
with a capacity market. Since price caps and market mitigation in the spot
market limit generators' ability to recover their fixed costs, the payments
generators receive in capacity markets should suffice to cover any fixed
costs not recovered in the spot market, as long as the generators have not
overbuilt their capacity. A capacity requirement that also encourages long-
term resource adequacy would ensure that enough generation capacity is
online to prevent shortages due to spot prices' inability to signal
impending problems with sufficient lead time.39
35 Cf Joskow, supra note 23, at 22 ("[l]mmature, incomplete and illiquid forward markets
for risk hedging ... reduce[] the ability of investors in new generating capacity to hedge market risks
and increase[] their financing costs above what they would be if consumer and supplier risk
preferences could be better matched.").
36 Felder, supra note 17, at 28; Paul Farrell, Turbines Generate Questions: Concern, Not
Complaints, Over Plans for Inlet Power-Boost Source, NEWSDAY, Aug. 7, 2000, at A27. See also
Online Shopping, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 1, 2001, at 58 (describing Enporion's online auction of
"ready-to-install" turbines intended for generation companies that need increased generation "in a
matter of months").
37 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 466.
38 In addition to distributed generation, wind power has a lead time of only a few months
(four or five, to be exact), though wind power is much less reliable than combustion turbines. Peter
Asmus, California Crisis: The Best Argument Yet for Wind Power, ELECTRICITY J., Apr. 2001, at 44.
39 One means of ensuring long-term resource adequacy is to have a high reserve margin,
since capacity prices will increase whenever insufficient capacity exists to satisfy the reserve margin
even if load growth is not on track to surpass available generation for some time. Such a high reserve
margin, though, could be incorporated into the spot market and thus does not necessitate a capacity
requirement or a market. RAR embodies an alternative method, namely setting capacity requirements
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B. ICAP's Inadequacies
Several drawbacks to the ICAP market, one of them mentioned in
FERC's SMD NOPR, militate against using ICAP to ensure resource
adequacy. First, ICAP markets without price caps could experience
extreme swings in price. When a surplus of ICAP exists, its marginal cost
(and competitive price) is zero.40 The generator, after all, promises only to
bid a specified amount of capacity into the spot market; the generator is
not agreeing to deliver electricity to a particular LSE or to bid at a
particular price. When a shortage of ICAP exists, however, the cost of
supplying additional capacity is the levelized fixed cost of new
generation,41 which leads to high ICAP prices given the expensive nature
of generation capacity's fixed costs. The fact that ICAP trades are made
only a month in advance of the date when the generator must bid its
capacity into the spot market exacerbates the price spikes.
Second, ICAP markets are susceptible to exercises of market power.42
Consequently, ISOs have employed price caps in ICAP markets, thereby
suppressing scarcity prices and defeating ICAP's purpose of compensating
generators' fixed costs of efficient investments.43 ISO New England
("ISO-NE"), for instance, penalizes LSEs that are deficient in ICAP.44 The
penalty constitutes an implicit price cap, since no LSE would pay more
than the penalty for ICAP. ISO-NE's penalty is $6.15 per kilowatt-month
("kW-month"), equivalent to the levelized fixed cost of a peaking unit.45
Such a cap is likely too low to achieve a loss-of-load probability ("LOLP")
of one day in ten years.46 Sometimes the ICAP price will be less than the
years in advance. Additionally, for reasons discussed infra Subsection IllI.B.2, allowing consumers'
preferences to dictate the level of reliability is better than having a central decision-maker set the
reserve margin.
40 Amended Filing of ISO New England, Inc. at 15, ISO New England, Inc., FERC Docket
No. EL0O-62-001 (May 8, 2000), available at http://ferris.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch.asp.
41 In capacity markets that impose a penalty for ICAP deficiencies, the price will equal the
penalty when total ICAP is less than required capacity. See STOFT, supra note 7, at 182-84.
42 Amended Filing of ISO New England, Inc. at 8-10, ISO New England, Inc., FERC
Docket No. EL00-62-001 (May 8, 2000), available at
http://ferris.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch.asp.
43 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 544-46.
44 New England Power Pool and ISO New England, Inc., 100 FERC 61,287, 13, 97-98
(2002) (order accepting in part and modifying in part Standard Market Design filing and dismissing
compliance filing).
45 New England Power Pool, 100 FERC 61,287 13, 97-98; E-ACUMEN, FINAL REPORT ON
THE LEVELIZED ANNUAL COST OF CONSTRUCTING A NEW PEAKING RESOURCE IN NEW ENGLAND 6
(2001), available at http://www.iso-ne.com/special_studies/OtherSpecialStudies/
New EnglandPeakingResource Cost e-Acumen_ 12-10-0l.pdf(last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
46 See, e.g., Benjamin F. Hobbs et al., Installed Capacity and Price Caps: Oil on the Water,
or Fuel on the Fire?, 14 ELECTRICITY J., July 2001, at 26 (finding that an equilibrium price of
$7/MWh for ICAP is necessary to achieve an LOLP ofone day in ten years when a $1000/MWh price
cap prevails in the spot market). New estimates of the cost of installed capacity suggest that the
numbers used in Hobbs et al.'s model were too low. Report of Boland & Inon, supra note 23, at 7-10.
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47cap, and thus the average payments generators receive in the ICAP
market will not cover the fixed costs of efficient peaking units. 48 Whether
generators actually install peaking units despite being unable to recover
peaking units' fixed costs in the ICAP market will depend on spot prices.
Market-power abuses or a shortage of operating reserves could lead to
energy-only payments that exceed peaking units' variable costs enough to
49incentivize investment that ensures an LOLP of one day in ten years.
Third, ICAP requires LSEs and generators to incur the transaction
cost of trading in yet another market. Unless generators and LSEs enter
into forward contracts to satisfy the ICAP requirement, which for most
generators and LSEs seems unlikely,50 they still must trade in the spot
market: Generators must trade to fulfill their ICAP commitment, and LSEs
to purchase deliverable electricity.
C. FERC's Alternative: A Resource Adequacy Requirement
Dissatisfied with ICAP markets, 5' FERC has proposed a Resource
Adequacy Requirement to ensure long-term resource adequacy. Instead of
requiring LSEs to secure capacity a month ahead of delivery, FERC
suggests a time horizon of at least two years ahead but permits regions to
set a longer time horizon if they wish.52 Under RAR, Independent
Transmission Providers ("ITPs")53 forecast future load and allocate a
portion to each LSE based on the ratio of the LSE's load to the regional
load.54 Another entity, the Regional State Advisory Committee, determines
the reserve margin to be added to the LSE's load assignment, although
FERC has set a floor of twelve percent.55
47 Recall that, during a surplus of ICAP, its marginal cost-and its competitive price-is $0.
48 If the peaking units were inframarginal in the spot market, then they could be recovering
the remainder of their fixed costs in the spot market. Since peaking units are the most expensive units
to run, they are more likely to be on the margin in the spot market than be inframarginal. See Joskow,
supra note 23, at 34-36.
49 Although the Hobbs et al. model takes scarcity spot prices into account, it abstracts from
the effect market-power abuses and an operating reserve requirement have on spot prices. Report of
Boland & Inon, supra note 23, at 5-8. The same is true of Boland & Inon's update of the Hobbs et al.
model. Id. at 8-11. In contrast, Boland & lnon's simulation of FERC's SMD, infra note 86, does
account for the effect of market power and an operating reserve requirement on spot prices. Id. at 5,
14-17, AIO (assuming that prices spike to the lesser of consumers' willingness to pay or the
S1000/MWh cap whenever operating reserves fall below the largest unit's capacity and that a penalty
applies whenever operating reserves are less than the operating reserve requirement).
50 The short time span between the ICAP and spot markets makes it seem unlikely that
parties that do not contract forward in the absence of ICAP will shift course and start to do so in the
presence of an ICAP market, since insurance against movements in spot prices thirty days after the
ICAP market is run seems a small benefit.
51 See Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 543-47.
52 Id. 523-24.
53 ITPs are the successors of ISOs; the differences between them are insignificant here.
54 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 474.
55 Id. 1 489-90, 493.
Yale Journal on Regulation
Enforcement of the RAR occurs after an LSE is deficient in real time,
and the severity of the penalty depends on how much of a shortage existed.
If an LSE is deficient in a year in which a shortage occurs, the ITP levies a
fine on top of the spot price of any electricity the LSE took from the spot
market during shortage conditions. 6 The ITP, however, limits the penalty
to the quantity by which the LSE "falls short of meeting its resource
adequacy requirement," 57  and the penalty, which never exceeds
$1000/MWh, is graduated according to the severity of the system's
shortfall: 8 If the shortage exceeds the system's reserve margin, requiring
the ITP to shed load, deficient LSEs will be curtailed first, 9 though only
up to the amount of their deficiency. 60 For LSEs that take electricity from




1. Tension with Competitive Markets
The SMD NOPR's overriding purpose is "to harness the benefits of
competitive markets for the nation's electric energy customers., 62 FERC's
RAR proposal, however, seems at loggerheads with SMD's goal; RAR is
reminiscent of the old, vertically-integrated regulated-utility model that
FERC intends to leave behind. First, to achieve long-term resource
adequacy, under RAR an ITP must forecast future load several years in
56 Id. 534. Besides the spot price, LSEs also pay transmission charges, but that does not
affect my point here.
57 Id. 528. Since LSEs are allocated a share of projected load plus a reserve margin, the
LSEs are deficient even if they secured capacity equal to their load but short of the amount the ITP
allocated to them.
The consequences for being deficient apparently vary depending upon whether a deficient LSE
later cures its deficiency. In a footnote, FERC says that an LSE that tails to submit a satisfactory
resource plan after being assigned its share of forecasted load would be subject to the penalty rate
during a shortage in the year for which it was supposed to plan. See id. 527 n.227. The penalty,
though, applies only to LSEs that use the spot market to purchase more electricity than the resources
they had secured. Id. 529. (It is unclear whether the reserves portion of an LSE's load allocation
would always be a factor affecting the quantity subject to the penalty.) Thus, LSEs that submit
unsatisfactory resource plans can still remedy their inadequacy later and not be penalized. In fact,
FERC encourages LSEs to make amends, as long as they do so before the spot market is run. Id. 528
n.229. The implications of this enforcement scheme are discussed infra Subsection II.A.2. See also
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advance and evaluate LSEs' plans for providing adequate resources to
meet the projected load.63 This appears very similar to the regulated
planning process of vertically-integrated utilities. In fact, FERC's proposal
is closer to the command-and-control model than is ICAP, with its shorter
time horizon that makes such planning unnecessary. Second, after an ITP
has forecasted future load, a Regional State Advisory Committee will set
the required reserve margin, which is added to forecasted load when
calculating LSEs' load assignments.64 Although FERC lists various factors
the Advisory Committee should take into account when setting the reserve
margin, ultimately the Committee has discretion to choose the reserve
margin. Again, this central planning runs counter to the competitive
approach,65 which would let consumers' preferences dictate the level of
reliability via the market.
Besides RAR's similarities to the old central-planning model for
electricity generation, it stunts the development of demand response,
which is generally recognized as the key to a stable, competitive market.6 6
In a deregulated market, exercising market power becomes much more
profitable when demand response is absent; the profits possible from
withholding increase when demand cannot curb price spikes. Aside from
market-power abuses, during shortage conditions a market without
demand response would fail to clear, necessitating regulatory intervention:
Once scarcity prices exceed the value of electricity consumption, the
regulator should shed load.
Although the RAR permits demand response to participate as a
resource that LSEs may use to satisfy their load assignments, 6 eligible
demand response must pre-commit. According to the SMD NOPR,
demand response must be "verifiable," and the ITP "must have confidence
that the demand response resource will be able to contribute when called
on during a shortage., 68 The two forms of demand response that expressly
satisfy RAR are biddable demand reduction and interruptible load.69 Under
biddable demand reduction, load agrees to drop off the system once pre-
determined price levels are reached. 0 To qualify as interruptible, load
63 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 485-87, 501.
64 Id. 489-90.
65 See id. 481 ("The proposed approach is like the traditional reserve margin requirement
imposed by states on monopoly utilities.").
66 See, e.g., Alfred E. Kahn, The Adequacy of Prospective Returns on Generation
Investments Under Price Control Mechanisms, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2002, at 37 (claiming that
demand response is necessary to establish competitive electricity markets); LARRY E. RUFF,
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF DLMA.ND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY 6-9 (2002) (describing the benefits of
demand response).
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must agree to interruptions under defined shortage conditions in exchange
for a year-round lower price.7 Even if load meets these requirements, it
may still be ineligible if transmission constraints prevent delivery of the
released generation to the area using it to satisfy the RAR.72
Due to the conditions load must satisfy to qualify as demand response
under RAR, the requirement will incentivize less demand response than
would a regime with real-time prices ("RTPs"). The stochastic character of
a particular load's needs may prevent it from participating in RAR demand
response, since RAR requires load to pre-commit and thus predict what its
future needs will be when called upon to back down. In an RTP regime, in
contrast, load can decide to back down contemporaneously with the price
spikes, at which point the load's needs are known. For some load, at pre-
determined price levels the benefit of backing down (namely, the savings
from not paying for electricity) will always be larger than the cost
(namely, ceasing whatever productive activity the electricity facilitated),
and such load would participate in RAR demand response. For other load,
the tradeoff requires estimating expectations and taking risk aversion into
account. Load whose expected benefit from backing down is greater than
the expected cost of doing so may still refuse to pre-commit if the load is
averse to risk. In fact, particularly risk-averse load or load whose expected
cost of backing down is greater than its expected benefits will not
participate in RAR demand response even though it would sometimes
reduce demand in an RTP regime. Under an RTP regime, instances would
arise when the benefit unambiguously surpassed the cost, and at that point
demand would back down, regardless of whether it would pre-commit to
doing so. Further complicating matters, transmission constraints will
prevent load from providing RAR demand response if the constraints
sometimes prevent delivery of electricity from the demand response to the
load using that demand response to satisfy the RAR. 73 Again, load would
not have to pre-commit under RTPs, so that probabilistic transmission
constraints would not preclude load from providing demand response.
Additionally, since generation freed up by RTP demand response would
not have to serve load at a pre-determined location (as is the case with
RAR demand response), the probability that transmission constraints
would hinder delivery of demand response would be lower for RTP than
for RAR demand response.
71 Id. 518.
72 /d. 519.
73 FERC's SMD NOPR devotes only a single sentence to probabilistic transmission
constraints. Id. ("If load in an area 'buys' demand reduction from another area .... the transmission
needed to deliver the freed-up generation to the load that relies on it must be available."). Since at least
some non-zero probability that transmission constraints will be binding always exists, FERC must have
some other measure of availability in mind. If a zero probability of binding transmission constraints
were the standard, no load would qualify as RAR demand response, except vis-A-vis itself.
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All this assumes that the probability distributions of shortages,
electricity prices, and the timing of shortages are available to load. Given
the lack of historical data on reliability under a competitive (or partially-
competitive) regime, however, load might not be able to estimate these
probability distributions. In that case, the differential between demand
response under RAR and under scarcity pricing would be even larger.
Load whose expected benefits of participating in RAR demand response
are actually larger than its expected costs may fail to participate simply
because the load cannot estimate the expectations.
Although total demand response under RTPs would be greater than
under RAR, one can only speculate how large the differential would be,
since the inquiry is counterfactual. Data on RTP demand response already
exist, 4 but data on RAR demand response do not. Nevertheless, it seems
plausible that the differential would be large and that for most load the
expected cost of reducing demand would exceed the expected benefit 75 or
the risk involved would be too great, especially if pre-commitment under
RAR must occur years or months ahead.76
Furthermore, capacity markets established in response to RAR would
likely include price caps that, as in today's ICAP markets, suppress
scarcity prices and thereby inhibit demand response's development.
7
Without caps, price fluctuations are larger, and price spikes potentially
74 Georgia Power Company has an RTP demand-response program that includes both day-
ahead demand response and hour-ahead demand response, neither of which involves pre-commitment.
Mike O'Sheasy, Real 7i'ie Pricing at Georgia Power Company, in DYNAMIC PRICING, ADVANCED
METERING, AND DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS A1-A2 (Hewlett Found. Energy
Series, Oct. 2002). The program is open only to large customers. Id. at Al. Even so, demand response
"can reach as high as 800-1,000MW, or 5% of [Georgia Power Company's] peak," id., which should
be sufficient to produce a long-run market equilibrium. STOFT, supra note 7, at 143. Load on hour-
ahead demand response is significantly more elastic than load on day-ahead demand response. Id. at
A2 (showing that the largest customers, who are on the hour-ahead program, exhibit a price elasticity
of-0.2 at moderate prices and -0.28 at high prices, while customers on the day-ahead program exhibit a
price elasticity of -0.02 at moderate prices and -0.06 at high prices). Besides Georgia Power Company,
Gulf Power Company has instituted a residential demand response program. Gulf Power's Residential
Service Variable Price Option, in DYNAMIC PRICING, ADVANCED METERING, AND DEMAND
RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS BI (Hewlett Found. Energy Series, Oct. 2002). Participating
customers do not have to pre-commit and have on average reduced consumption 22% during high
price periods. Id. at B5, B8.
75 For instance, if a firm conducts the majority of its business at a particular time of day and
does not want to be interrupted then, it cannot make its availability for RAR demand response
contingent on the time of day. The firm could, of course, increase the price level at which it is willing
to be curtailed to reflect the value of electricity during its busiest period, but that would decrease its
overall demand response.
76 The fact that Georgia Power Company maintains an RTP demand-response program in
addition to an interruptible demand-response program, which requires pre-commitment, suggests that
the additional participation in RTP demand response warrants the cost of running a second demand-
response program. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ELECTRICITY PRICING, at
http://www.southemcompany.com/gapower/pricing/gpcrates.asp?mnuOpco=gpc&mnuTypc=com&m
nultem=ps#business (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
77 RAR allows but does not require ITPs to establish capacity markets. Remedying Undue
Discrimination, supra note 3, 549.
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limitless, giving load more incentive to invest in technologies it needs to
respond to RTPs,78 because then load can reduce its electricity costs to a
greater degree by taking electricity from the grid at non-peak times and
backing down at peak times. In fact, the presence of price caps in the spot
market is one of the main reasons FERC is proposing the RAR: Such caps
suppress scarcity pricing, and therefore the spot market alone cannot
assure resource adequacy. Without RAR or a comparable capacity
requirement, the current price-cap regime would have to be overhauled,
and consequently there would be even greater incentive for demand
response to develop.
In addition to stunting demand response, RAR creates an inefficient
pooling effect across different types of load. The pooling effect inheres in
any capacity requirement that includes a reserve margin, since a central
entity cannot tailor resource reliability to suit every agent's preference. In
the RAR regime, depending on the forecasts of future load and the
required reserve margin, elastic demand will want less reliability than is
mandated, or highly inelastic demand will prefer more reliability than is
mandated, or both.79 Elastic demand thus subsidizes load that prefers more
reliability, while inelastic demand is not permitted to pay for and receive
the level of reliability it prefers. Even though this cost is not unique to
RAR, it is a cost of imposing RAR.
2. Contradictions Within the RAR Proposal
Not only is RAR a step back toward the era of central planning, but
the RAR proposal is also internally contradictory. First, payments from an
RAR capacity market will not incentivize the generation necessary to
achieve an LOLP of one day in ten years, the standard measurement of
reliability.80 Although RAR does not require the establishment of a
capacity market,8' unless LSEs fulfill the RAR entirely through forward
contracts or call contracts, 2 LSEs will have to purchase capacity in a
separate market. As the ICAP markets in the northeastern ISOs have
demonstrated, 3 capacity markets are no more immune from market-power
78 For a description of the various metering and telecommunications systems required to
operationalize RTP, see Jaskc, supra note 15, at 39-45.
79 Kahn, supra note 66, at 42.
80 One day in ten years is the standard for reliability that the electricity industry has
adopted. See STOFT, supra note 7, at 182.
81 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 549.
82 Even if LSEs purchased all of their electricity through long-term forward contracts or call
contracts, FERC's penalties for RAR violations would limit the price an LSE would willingly pay. As
discussed below, though, LSEs have little incentive under RAR to enter forward contracts.
83 See. e.g., Amended Filing of ISO New England, Inc. at 9-12, ISO New England, Inc.,
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abuses than are spot markets.8 4 Consequently, ITPs will likely implement
price caps in the capacity markets they run. Even if they do not, FERC's
suggested penalties for violating the RAR would function as implicit price
caps. The penalties range from $500/MWh to $1000/MWh, 8 5 but to
achieve an LOLP of one day in ten years, the energy-deficiency penalty
should be higher, possibly around $20,000/MWh.86 As a result, RAR will
not achieve long-term resource adequacy; the capacity payments, in
addition to any scarcity rents from the spot market, will not cover the fixed
costs of the peaking units needed to ensure an LOLP of one day in ten
years.
Second, RAR does not encourage long-term resource adequacy;
instead of FERC's imposing penalties for resource deficiencies a certain
number of months before real-time delivery, RAR is enforced ex post.
FERC proposes to penalize only those LSEs that do not secure enough
resources to satisfy their share of the regional needs and only in the
amount by which they fall short and to the extent that they take electricity
from the spot market.87 LSEs that formulate unsatisfactory plans to meet
their resource requirement or that are deficient even a few days prior to a
shortage are not penalized as long as they contract for enough resources or
deliverable electricity or both before the day-ahead spot market is run.88 In
the case of an overall shortage, whether LSEs could cure their deficiencies
84 Hobbs et al., supra note 46, at 31.
85 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 530, 534. FERC specifically asked
for comments on its proposed penalties, Id. 530, so they may well be subject to change.
86 Report of Boland & Inon, supra note 23, at lI-17. Boland & non use data from the 2001
PJM market to calculate how large the RAR penalty must be to induce LSEs to pay for the capacity
necessary to achieve an LOLP of one day in ten years when the levelized fixed cost of a peaking unit is
$73,000/MW-year. Id. at 8, 10, 16. Boland & Inon's model assumes that the spot price equals the
marginal cost of the most expensive unit until operating reserves fall below the largest unit's capacity
(1170 MW in the model and in PJM), at which point the spot price spikes either to consumers'
willingness to pay or to the spot-price cap of $1000/MWh, whichever is lower. Id. at 5, 15, AIO. A
penalty is applied whenever operating reserves are less than 7.5%. Id. at 15. Boland & Inon derive the
following result: Even if the peaking units receive revenues from price spikes, ancillary services, and
operating reserves, the penalty must be S19,031/MWh irrespective of the reserve shortage's severity.
Id. at 15-17. In the case when peaking units do not receive ancillary revenues, the penalty increases to
$20,631/MWh. Id. at 17.
Boland & Inon's assumption that the spot price equals the marginal cost of the most
expensive unit when operating reserves are greater than the largest unit's capacity may be unrealistic if
generators are not price takers. See Peter Cramton, Report on Competitive Bidding Behavior in
Uniform-Price Auction Markets on Behalf of Duke Energy at 15-19, San Diego Gas & Electric
Company, FERC Docket No. ELOO-95-075 (Mar. 20, 2003). Spot prices in Boland & Inon's model,
however, spike after operating reserves drop below 1170MW without any restraint on the part of a
market monitor, suggesting that the scarcity revenues from these price spikes may offset any
shortcomings from Boland & Inon's assumption of marginal-cost pricing.
87 See supra note 57. These penalties potentially apply to an LSE that, while deficient, takes
from the spot market only an amount that generation under contract with the LSE agreed to deliver to
the spot market, in compliance with RAR. Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 505. A
similarly deficient LSE that entered bilateral contracts instead would not be penalized. Id. 528.
88 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 528.
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just two days ahead and thereby avoid curtailment is unclear, though the
SMD does not expressly bar them from doing so.89 Even if deficient LSEs
take from the spot market during a curtailment, FERC's proposed penalty
is only $1000/MWh, 90 which is low compared to one estimate of the
penalty required to achieve an LOLP of one day in ten years. 9'
RAR's ex post enforcement and implicit price caps doom FERC's
achieving its long-term resource adequacy goal.92 Not only does RAR not
require LSEs to obtain resources by any particular date, but LSEs also
have little incentive to contract with resources as far ahead as FERC would
like. If spot and short-term prices reflected scarcity and consequently were
volatile, then LSEs would have reason to hedge those prices by entering
into long-term forward contracts for electricity,93 coincidentally furthering
FERC's resource adequacy goals. Given FERC's small penalties and the
spot market's price caps, though, short-term price spikes will be limited
even in the face of shortages. Consequently, LSEs will have little incentive
to hedge against short-term price movements, and resource adequacy will
not be achieved via long-term energy contracts.
Thus, under RAR, achieving resource adequacy depends on
participants' responses to short-term prices. 94 Ironically, FERC proposed
the RAR because of short-term spot prices' supposed inability to signal
generation needs in a timely fashion.95 Under FERC's rationale, RAR
should fail: Short-term prices will not signal generation needs in time for
merchant generators to respond, and at times resources will be inadequate
to serve load.
B. Jurisdictional Problens
Even if RAR could achieve FERC's goals, the Federal Power Act
("FPA") expressly places electricity generation outside FERC's
jurisdiction. Whether that restriction prevents FERC from enforcing RAR
89 Id. 532.
90 Id. 534.
91 Report of Boland & Inon, supra note 23, at 15-17. Under RAR, if the ITP cannot
maintain reliability when an LSE takes from the spot market after being ordered to curtail, the cost to
the LSE of taking from the spot market would be much higher than the $1000/MWh plus the spot
price. Since all LSEs would suffer from the resulting blackout, though, the rebellious LSE would not
fully internalize the social cost of its behavior.
92 Larry E. Ruff, Assuring Resource Adequacy: Concepts, Options and the SMD, Slide 20,
Presentation to the Mass. Elec. Restructuring Roundtable (Oct. 18, 2002),
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/StandardMktdsgn/Ruffresource.adequacy- 10-1 8-02.pdf.
93 Since competitive wholesale markets are relatively new, firms may still be biased against
entering long-term forward contracts while they are learning how the market operates.
94 See Initial Comments of John D. Chandley and William W. Hogan on the Standard
Market Design NOPR at 92-95, FERC Docket No. RM0I-12-000 (Nov. 11, 2002), available at
http://ferris. ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch asp.
95 See supra Subsection I.A.2.
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entirely is debatable, but it certainly prevents FERC from using RAR to
mandate generation expansion.
1. FERC's Legal Authority (According to FERC)
Although FERC does not cite any legal authority to justify the RAR
in particular, it does explain the legal basis for SMD as a whole. FERC
invokes Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act ("FPA") as its
statutory authority.96 The former prohibits undue discrimination in
transmission of electricity in interstate commerce or in wholesale sales in
interstate commerce, 97 which is more relevant to FERC's transmission
reforms than to its capacity requirement.98 Section 206 is more on point. It
gives FERC power to remedy any "rule, regulation, [or] practice" resulting
in rates and charges that are "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory
or preferential" by promulgating a "just and reasonable" replacement.99 If
this section were the end of the matter, FERC could decide that not having
a capacity requirement results in electricity prices that are unjust or
unreasonable (due, say, to a generation shortage), and it could implement a
capacity requirement as the necessary remedy. Besides the FPA, FERC
could have cited the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Section 722 of the Act
gives FERC authority to require wholesale transmission rates that
"promote the economically efficient ... generation of electricity.' 0 The
argument would be that RAR is necessary to ensure wholesale
transmission rates that achieve efficient generation, since creating new
generation is one means of eliminating load pockets and the higher
transmission charges that accompany them.'0 '
In addition to relying on its statutory authority, FERC looks to the
case law. According to FERC, the courts have made clear that FERC's
"authority to remedy undue discrimination and anticompetitive effects is
broad." 0 2 Since a capacity shortage not only exacerbates market power but
also results from FERC's attempts to control market power in the spot
96 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 100.
97 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (2000) ("No public utility shall, with respect to any transmission or
sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference or
advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain
any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, either as
between localities or as between classes of service.").
98 To the extent that building new generation relieves transmission congestion, Section 205
may be relevant to RAR.
99 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2000).
100 16 U.S.C. § 824k (2000).
101 More generation in a load pocket will decrease the amount of electricity that must be
imported into the load pocket, thereby relieving transmission congestion.
102 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 101. For support, FERC cites Gulf
States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973); Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); City of Huntingburg v. FPC, 498 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Id. 101 n.72-73.
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markets, RAR appears to be an authorized remedy for anticompetitive
effects in the electricity market.
2. FERC's Legal Authority (According to the United States Code)
FERC's authority over generation is subject to a large exception that
goes unmentioned in the SMD NOPR. Section 201 of the FPA declares
that FERC "shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided in
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter, over facilities used for
the generation of electric energy."10 3 Other sections of the FPA that touch
upon generation fail to extend FERC's powers to mandating construction
of new generation. Section 202 permits FERC to create "regional districts
for the voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities for the
generation" of electricity, 10 4 but it restricts such limited intervention in
generation to instances in which the utility consents. 10 5 Even if FERC finds
it in the public interest to order a public utility to interconnect with another
utility, it cannot "compel the enlargement of generating facilities for such
purposes."'06 When planning for shortages, FERC may order a public
utility to issue a report on its contingency plans in case of a shortage, but
that power does not extend to ordering a public utility to prepare in any
particular way for a shortage.10 7 Similarly, according to Section 311,
FERC can investigate generation at any time and report the results to
Congress, but it is not authorized to take any actions in response to its
investigation. °8 Most importantly, Section 207 of the FPA, which
specifically authorizes FERC to issue orders to ensure adequate service,
expressly prevents FERC from ordering "the enlargement of generating
facilities" for adequacy purposes.'°9
When Congress wanted FERC to encourage construction of certain
forms of generation and thereby improve reliability, it "specifically
103 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2000).
104 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (2000).
105 See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that Section
202 "make[s] clear that Congress intended coordination and interconnection arrangements be left to
the 'voluntary' action of the utilities").
106 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (2000).
107 16 U.S.C. § 824a(g) (2000). Although the FPA does not expressly prohibit FERC from
ordering a public utility to prepare for a shortage, neither does it authorize FERC to do so. And courts
"will not presume a delegation of power based solely on the fact that there is not an express
withholding of such power." Atlantic City, 295 F.3d at 9 (quoting Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d
1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). See also New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18 (2002) ("[Aln agency
literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State,
unless and until Congress confers power upon it." (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S.
355, 374 (1986))).
108 16 U.S.C. § 825j (2000).
109 16 U.S.C. § 824f(2000).
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provided" for such jurisdiction, as Section 201 permits," ° by passing the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"). Congress's
findings accompanying PURPA do not cite any delinquency on FERC's
part as a reason for passing PURPA, so presumably Congress was not
attempting to force FERC to exercise jurisdiction it already had.'" Even
under PURPA's section pertaining to reliability, FERC is not authorized to
promulgate industry standards of reliability; FERC may only recommend
such standards to the industry." 2 Although PURPA on its own does not
prove that FERC lacks jurisdiction over generation, it further supports the
claim that Congress did not intend that FERC's jurisdiction over
generation extend beyond the narrow limits set in the FPA, unless
Congress legislates to the contrary.
FERC's counterargument to a claim that RAR falls within the
generation exception to FERC's jurisdiction would likely be that RAR
does not mandate generation expansion. FERC does not care how LSEs
maintain generation adequacy. LSEs can satisfy the requirement by
implementing demand response or, if they are in a load pocket, by building
new transmission. All FERC is doing is requiring LSEs to ensure that
enough supply exists to serve their load.
Such a rationale, though, would permit FERC to evade the FPA's
explicit restrictions through a sleight of hand, since RAR has the effect of
mandating generation construction to satisfy LSEs' load assignments.
Granted, LSEs could invest in demand reduction and new transmission to
serve their load rather than build more generation capacity.' 13 But the
quantity of demand response under the RAR regime will likely not be
substantial given FERC's requirement that demand pre-commit to qualify
as demand response.' 14 Additionally, the eminent domain authority needed
to construct transmission likely precludes LSEs from relying on increased
transmission, since politicians are not keen on having new transmission
lines sited in their districts or states (the "not-in-my-backyard"
phenomenon)."' Given these constraints, in many cases LSEs' only means
of satisfying the RAR will be to pay for or construct new generation. If
110 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2000) (FERC "shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically
provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter ... .
IIl See 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
112 16 U.S.C. § 824a-2(c) (2000).
113 Although for the sake of argument I treat demand response as though it were within
FERC's jurisdiction, it may fall within the retail distribution exception to FERC's jurisdiction. See 16
U.S.C. § 824(b) ("The Commission . .. shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided in
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter, . . over facilities used in local distribution ... .
114 See supra Subsection II.A.1.
115 An example of the political hurdles that block transmission expansion is Connecticut
Attomey General Richard Blumenthal's opposition to the Long Island Power Authority's transmission
cable that connects Long Island to southem Connecticut. See Linda L. Randell & Bruce L. McDermott,
Chronicle ofa Transmission Line Siting, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 1,2003, at 34.
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FERC can bypass the FPA's constraints by promulgating a regulation that
could be complied with either by activities over which FERC has
jurisdiction or by activities over which FERC does not have jurisdiction,
and if the former activities are theoretically possible but practically
infeasible, then for that issue the FPA would lose any bite it otherwise had
vis-a-vis FERC. Unless the FPA's exceptions to FERC's jurisdiction are
meaningless, the RAR falls outside FERC's jurisdiction.' 16 Or at the very
least, FERC may not penalize an LSE for deficiencies whose only practical
cure is generation construction, a fuzzy standard that would hinder
enforcement.
3. FERC's Legal Authority (According to the Case Law)
No case is directly on point, since FERC's RAR represents a recent
foray into resource adequacy on FERC's part. The Supreme Court, though,
has recognized the generation exception to FERC's jurisdiction even when
it has not been central to the case."17 More importantly, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals recently refused to recognize FERC's attempts to
interpret the FPA broadly when the statutory language does not grant
FERC power to act as it did." 8 In Atlantic City, FERC claimed jurisdiction
under Section 203 of the FPA over the reorganization of a pre-existing
power pool into an ISO. The Court, quoting the FPA, noted that Section
203 provides that "'[n]o public utility shall sell, lease, or otherwise dispose
of' jurisdictional facilities whose value exceeds $50,000" without
receiving FERC's approval." 9 FERC argued that the reorganization
amounted to a disposition and thus required FERC's approval. The D.C.
Circuit, however, rejected FERC's characterization. The reorganization did
not entail any "transfer of ownership or even physical operation of [the
utilities'] facilities.' 20 Not only that, but FERC's interpretation of
disposition was also "an unexplained departure from past FERC
practice.'' FERC's claim that Section 203 applied was therefore invalid,
and the reorganization did not require FERC's approval. This holding does
116 FERC could also argue that the Regional State Advisory Committees are implementing
the RAR and rely on the states' recognized jurisdiction over generation to avoid the FPA's bar to
FERC's jurisdiction. The Advisory Committees' involvement, though, is limited. While they set the
exact level of resource adequacy and the planning horizon for the region, FERC determines certain
minimum levels of adequacy as well as the penalties and enforcement mechanism applied to deficient
LSEs. Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 493, 524, 527. The same goes for FERC's
intent to have states enforce the LSEs' load obligations. Id. 533. Even if states are enforcing the
RAR, FERC retains regulatory authority by determining the RAR's content.
117 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 21 (2002) (recognizing that generation facilities are
excepted from FERC's jurisdiction).
I 18 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
119 Id. at II (emphasis omitted).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 12.
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not bode well for any creative label FERC might use to bring RAR within
its jurisdiction.1
22
FERC may not be at as great a disadvantage as Atlantic City suggests,
since a recent Supreme Court case went so far as to expand FERC's
jurisdiction beyond FERC's own interpretation (albeit on significantly
different facts). 23 In New York v. FERC, the controversy centered on
FERC's imposition of open-access requirements on unbundled retail
transmissions that are interstate transmissions. 2 4 Before 1996, FERC had
refrained from exercising jurisdiction over retail transmission, and New
York sought to block FERC's reversal of this sixty-year-old practice, a
change that threatened New York's as well as other states' regulatory
powers. Nevertheless, the Court held that, since retail transmission is not
one of the exceptions carved out of the FPA, FERC has jurisdiction over
unbundled retail transmission in interstate commerce. Furthermore, the
Court said, were FERC to find undue discrimination in the retail electricity
market, it would also have jurisdiction over bundled retail transmission in
interstate commerce, 125 a claim from which even FERC had shied away.
In New York v. FERC, though, FERC's jurisdiction explicitly
followed from Section 201 of the FPA, which grants FERC jurisdiction
over "transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce."' 26
Additionally, the Court noted that, should FERC exercise authority over
bundled retail sales, FERC would raise thorny jurisdictional issues, since
FERC has jurisdiction only over the interstate transmission component of
the bundled sale. 27 Applied to RAR, New York v. FERC suggests that,
even if FERC has authority to implement RAR to the extent that it
increases demand response and transmission construction, FERC cannot
enforce RAR when generation construction is necessary to cure LSEs'
deficiency.
122 On remand, FERC has attempted to bolster its claim that creation of the PJM ISO, as well
as entry into and exit from the ISO, is a disposition that requires FERC's approval. Pennsylvania-New
Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, 101 FERC 61,318 (2002). FERC claims that the court's
interpretation of "other disposition" reflects FERC's failure to explain its position well enough. 1d.
43. FERC argues that, because the PJM ISO-unlike its predecessor PJM Power Pool-is
"independently governed," "directs the operation of the transmission facilities," and "is prohibited
from taking direction from any transmission owner," the reorganization from a power pool into an ISO
qualifies as a disposition within the meaning of Section 203. Id. 44-46. Whether the D.C. Circuit will
be sympathetic to FERC's arguments remains to be seen. Atlantic City Electric Company is unswayed
and has filed a mandamus petition claiming that FERC's order on remand simply repeats arguments
that the D.C. Circuit has already rejectcd. Petition to Enforce the Mandate at 2, Atlantic City Elec. Co.
v. FERC (D.C. Cir.) (No. 97-1097).
123 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 21.
124 Id. at 4-5.
125 Id. at 22, 26. A bundled charge includes both the cost of the electricity and the cost of its
delivery. An unbundled charge decouples the two and charges load separately for the electricity and
the transmission.
126 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2000).
127 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 26.
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III. Alternatives to RAR
Before implementing a capacity requirement that will be ineffective
and will stunt the growth of competitive wholesale markets for electricity,
FERC should explore the alternatives. Given ICAP's own drawbacks, that
is not an alternative I consider. Neither do I consider a retooled version of
RAR that actually provides long-term resource adequacy; such an RAR
would discourage demand response, since demand response would have to
pre-commit far ahead of real time. Rather, I examine two possibilities: (1)
requiring LSEs to purchase enough call options for electricity to guarantee
that they can serve their entire load and (2) replacing the current price-cap
regime with a spot-price cap equal to the value of lost load ("VOLL"),
such that generators recover all of their fixed costs in the spot market.
A. Require Call Options for Capacity
Some have suggested replacing capacity markets with a market for
call options and mandating that generators sell and LSEs acquire enough
call options to cover future capacity needs not otherwise serviced through
forward contracts.' 28 For each call option, the generator would agree either
to sell up to a specified quantity of electricity at a particular price (the
strike price) should the spot price ever exceed the strike price or to pay the
purchaser the difference between the strike and spot prices. Consider a
hypothetical call option whose strike price is $100/MWh and whose
quantity is 500MWh. If the spot price reaches $150/MWh and the LSE
calls its option, the generator can either supply the LSE with 500MWh of
electricity at $100/MWh or pay the LSE $25,000. As for the LSE, it pays
the option price, which is analogous to a capacity payment. Unlike a
contract securing ICAP, though, the individual LSE receives something in
return, namely a ceiling on its risk. 2 9
The parameters of a call option for capacity include the time horizon,
the strike price, the quantity, and a possible penalty for non-delivery. The
range these parameters can take depends on the potential for market-power
abuse and the regulator's goals. For the time horizon, to ensure long-term
resource adequacy, the option would have to be effective some years into
the future. Either the option's time horizon would have to extend several
years, or the option would not take effect for some years into the future.
LSEs would be required to have sufficient call options throughout the time
128 See lgnacio J. Perez-Arriaga, et al., A Market Approach to Long-Term Security of Supply,
17 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS 349, 352 (2002) [hereinafter Market Approach]; Ignacio
J. Perez-Arriaga, et al., If Pay-As-Bid Auctions Are Not a Solution for California, Then Why Not a
Reliability Market?, ELECTRICITY J., May 2001, at 47.
129 Recall that a generator offering capacity in a capacity market only commits to sell that
capacity into the spot market, not to a particular LSE or at a particular price.
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period during which the regulator wishes to ensure resource adequacy.
Otherwise an LSE could opt out of the requirement by purchasing a call
option that lasts, say, one hour during an entire year.
Since LSEs and generators will have to contract for their call options
by a particular point before the options take effect, the ITPs would likely
run a residual market for those LSEs that have not purchased their call
options prior to the deadline. The ITPs would have to use MMMs in the
residual market to prevent generators from abusing their market power vis-
A-vis the LSEs. For LSEs contracting outside the residual market,
dislocations due to market-power abuses are unlikely to occur, since an
LSE that does not want to be taken advantage of can always wait until the
residual market is run before fulfilling the call-option requirement. As a
result, the MMMs would be limited to the residual market.
In addition to the time horizon, regulatory intervention would be
necessary to prevent opting out through the strike price. The regulator
should set a cap on the strike price. Otherwise, generators and LSEs could
agree to a strike price high enough that the option would never be called,
driving the option's price to zero, effectively permitting generators and
LSEs to opt out of the requirement. Even with a cap, MMMs would be
necessary to prevent generators from exercising market power by
manipulating the strike price.
Another parameter of the call option is the quantity the generator
offers to sell at the strike price. Since economic and physical withholding
are the only concerns the regulator would have with quantity, the
regulator's involvement should be limited to market mitigation.
Last, a penalty could attach to the call options if the generators that
sell them fail to provide energy when called upon. Although Perez-Arriaga
et al. advocate a penalty,' 30 it seems superfluous. Since generators are
obligated to pay LSEs the difference between the strike and spot prices if
they do not provide the electricity themselves, the generators are
internalizing the entire cost of their behavior. If the price cap in the spot
market is set at VOLL, and the VOLL underestimates a particular LSE's
cost of backing down,' 3 ' that LSE could contract for a penalty that reflects
its idiosyncratic VOLL and that applies when the LSE cannot obtain
electricity elsewhere due to a curtailment. A penalty applied uniformly
would, in all likelihood, not provide the level of adequacy that many
market participants desire, as exemplified by the pooling effect.'32
130 Perez-Arriaga et al., Market Approach, supra note 128, at 354.
131 Why the spot price should not exceed VOLL is explored infra Subsection II.B. 1.
132 See supra text accompanying note 79.
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I. Benefits of a Call-Option Regime
If the enforcement mechanisms were implemented correctly, call
options would guarantee long-term resource adequacy and would also
encourage the development of financial instruments that LSEs may use to
hedge future spot prices. The option's strike price effectively creates a
price cap for the LSE that purchased it. Unlike a regulated price cap,
though, the market determines how much LSEs value price stability, since
the premium an LSE would pay for the option would be inversely related
to the strike price. Market forces may not completely determine this
competitive "price cap," however, because a cap on the strike price would
function as a floor on the option's price to the extent the option's price is
inversely related to the strike price.
Additionally, call options decrease the risk associated with peaking
units, which are called upon only when the level of load is very high. Such
units may not be called upon to provide electricity for long periods of time,
and then, for example, when abnormal weather patterns lead to an increase
in load, the peaking units are called and reap huge revenues. Call options
smooth that revenue stream; the cost of peakers is no longer concentrated
in a short time period that no one can anticipate exactly. Consequently,
with an active option market, peakers may attract investors for whom the
risk was previously unpalatable. A capacity market, though, would
similarly smooth peakers' revenue streams; capacity payments would take
into account the likelihood that generators must bid their peakers into the
spot market to fulfill their obligations. With options, though, individual
LSEs receive the benefit of hedging risk, whereas in capacity markets
LSEs benefit only indirectly from generators' commitment to bid into the
spot market.
2. Shortcomings of a Call-Option Regime
Although the growth of financial instruments that hedge future spot
prices might be advantageous, artificial growth in response to regulatory
requirements would be counterproductive. Granted, by requiring that all
market participants buy and sell in the option market, a call-option
requirement may correct market failure resulting, for instance, from
uncertainty about market liquidity.'33 Given the lack of historical data on
spot-price trends in competitive electricity markets, though, generators
133 Such uncertainty might have discouraged investment in necessary setup costs for the call-
option market. See also Joskow, supra note 23, at 22 ("[I]mmature, incomplete and illiquid forward
markets for risk hedging . . . reduce[] the ability of investors in new generating capacity to hedge
market risks and increase[) their financing costs above what they would be if consumer and supplier
risk preferences could be better matched.").
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may have trouble pricing call options, and as a result the requirement may
simply force generators to sell call options they otherwise would not,
regardless of liquidity concerns, and to price the options rather high,
especially if the call options are sold far ahead of when they take effect.
34
Another response may be to increase activity in 5orward contracts for
electricity as an alternative to call options. Assuming the call-option
requirement did not correct prior market failure that discouraged forward
contracting, 35 to the extent that the call-option requirement spurs such
contracting, it represents a regulatory distortion rather than a market
optimum.
Also, call options add a layer of complexity that a market monitor
may have difficulty peeling away when it applies its MMMs. The market
monitor cannot have just one screen for the price, one for quantity, one for
the time horizon, and another for the strike price. One screen must
integrate all four. Otherwise generators could adjust the four parameters
without tripping the threshold for any individual parameter while
accomplishing the same overall effect as a change that would trip an
individual parameter's threshold.
Last, a call-option regime would create inefficiencies if a central
decision-maker has to assign LSEs a particular portion of estimated future
load. In that case, a call-option requirement would resemble a command-
and-control regulatory structure, similar to RAR. The call-option regime,
however, may avoid specifying an individual LSE's load assignment by
instituting market-oriented penalties that discourage LSEs from free-riding
on the resources other LSEs secure via option contracts.
136
B. Raise Price Caps to the Value of Lost Load
I. Spot Prices
Although a call-option requirement may be superior to RAR, a better
alternative exists. Raising price caps to VOLL is, perhaps paradoxically,
the key to curing current market imperfections that RAR is meant to
134 Since the same uncertainty would exist in a capacity market where capacity must be
assured several years before the capacity is bid into thc market, this shortcoming does not favor a
capacity requirement over a call-option requirement, assuming the capacity requirement would achieve
long-term resource adequacy.
135 Not having an option market may have discouraged parties from contracting forward. For
one, generators could not buy call options to hedge their forward positions and LSEs could not buy put
options to do the same. An active call option market, developed in response to the requirement, would
provide generators with easy access to hedging vehicles and may also encourage the development of a
market for put options. Also, since forward contracts serve as substitutes for call options, the call-
option requirement may spur generators and LSEs to contract forward, something they perhaps
avoided previously due to regulatory uncertainty or a lack of liquidity in forward markets.
136 See infra Subsection lI.B.2.
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address. The major fear about this alternative is that market imperfections,
if not constrained by price caps below the VOLL, will lead to disasters
such as the California crisis. The California debacle, however, is more the
exception than the rule: In California, poorly designed market rules
encouraged market-power abuses that led to blackouts and prices far above
marginal cost.137 In normally functioning markets price spikes occur for
short periods of time and constitute a relatively small proportion of load's
overall bill.'38
Although raising price caps will likely increase the effect of price
spikes on load's bills, allowing prices to reflect scarcity conditions is
central to a smoothly-functioning competitive market. Scarcity prices will
spur investment in demand response. They increase the marginal benefits
of demand response, and consequently load has more incentive to pay for
technologies that facilitate communication of RTPs and that meter load's
usage in real-time.' 9 As demand becomes more elastic in response to real-
time pricing, peak load decreases, non-peak load increases, and changes in
supply have a smaller effect on price.
Of course, price caps cannot be completely eliminated. Until demand
response develops, load could exceed supply, electricity markets would
fail to clear, and the price for electricity would exceed the cost of not
having it. Curtailing load then becomes more efficient than paying the spot
price to obtain enough deliverable electricity to satisfy load. For now,
prices should be capped at the VOLL, the opportunity cost of energy
consumption. Having VOLL as a price cap leaves enough flexibility in the
market price to induce demand response 140 and prevents prices at which
social welfare is unequivocally suboptimal. Once demand response is
sufficiently sophisticated to control price spikes, then FERC should
137 FINAL REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION, supra note 5, at ESI-ES3; BLUMSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 22-26; Paul Joskow, California's Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL'Y
365, 380-81 (2001); Paul Joskow & Edward Kahn, Identifying the Exercise of Market Power: Refining
the Estimates 5 (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal on Regulation). But see
Scott M. Harvey & William W. Hogan, On the Exercise of Market Power Through Strategic
Withholding in California i-ii (Apr. 24, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal on
Regulation) (arguing that market-power abuses may not be to blame for the California crisis, especially
in light of higher fuel costs, environmental constraints, and capacity shortages). The FERC Staff
Report, however, undercuts Harvey & Hogan's analysis; the report documents multiple market-power
abuses, including some in the natural gas market that were intended to affect electricity prices. FINAL
REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION, supra note 5, at ESI-ES3 ("[M]arkets for natural gas and
electricity in California are inextricably linked, and ... dysfunctions in each fed off one another during
the crisis.").
138 Larry E. Ruff, Demand Response: Reality Versus "Resource," ELECTRICITY J., Dec.
2002, at 13.
139 See supra note 78.
140 Australia's VOLL, for instance, was estimated at between 15,OOOAUD/MWh and
25,OOOAUD/MWh (approximately $9000/MWh and $15,000/MWh, respectively), substantially higher
than current price caps of$1000/MWh. STOFT, supra note 7, at 140.
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eliminate the VOLL price cap as well, leaving such valuation to the
market's more accurate determination.
Estimating VOLL is easier said than done, but estimation errors are
unlikely to have much of a negative effect, especially if VOLL is
overestimated. Complications in estimating VOLL arise because VOLL
varies depending on customer type, the time of the loss, and the duration
of the loSS.14' The losses that commercial end users suffer from an outage
during peak hours are much higher than the losses residential end users
suffer,142 and blackouts affect all users indiscriminately. Outages at peak
hours cause higher losses, since businesses activities are usually in full
swing during peaks. Last, the first few moments of an outage are
disproportionately costly due to the damage that the mere occurrence of an
outage causes; if the outage is prolonged, though, the cost rises again as
businesses are forced to close and as vandalism becomes more likely.
143
Despite these complicating factors, efforts at estimating VOLL have been
made. The costs of past outages, such as New York City's 1977 power
failure, 44  surveys of customers' valuations of reliability,1 4  and
applications of "common sense"'146 are three different methods used. The
results are far ranging, falling between $2,600/MWh and $22,000/MWh. 47
All of these figures, however, are much higher than current spot-price
caps, and fortunately the effects of miscalculating VOLL (which seems
inevitable) "are not dramatic."'4 8 The upper bound for the cost to load of
setting VOLL at $15,000/MWh when its actual value is $1500/MWh is
only 3.3 percent of the total cost of power, according to Stoft.
14 9
FERC's motivation for proposing RAR is not limited to the effects of
price caps. FERC also claims that market mitigation suppresses scarcity
prices. 's Although the MMMs attempt to screen market-power abuses
from instances of scarcity pricing,' 5' some false positives will inevitably
occur. Further, the transaction costs of justifying scarcity pricing to the
141 STOFT, supra note 7, at 156-57.
142 Peter Cramton & Jeffrey Lien, Value of Lost Load 3 (Feb. 14, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Yale Journal on Regulation) (citing a Canadian study finding that outages cost
commercial and industrial users $17,000/MWh of peak demand compared to $2000/MWh of peak
demand for residential users, when measured in 1999 dollars).
143 See STOFT, supra note 7, at 156; Cramton & Lien, supra note 142, at 1.
144 See Cramton & Lien, supra note 142, at 1.
145 Seeid. at 2.
146 See STOFT, supra note 7, at 160.
147 See id. at 160; Cramton & Lien, supra note 142, at 4. Note that Cramton & Lien's figures
were originally measured in 1999 dollars. I updated them to 2002 dollars, using the Consumer Price
Index inflation calculator. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX INFLATION CALCULATOR,
ai http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
148 STOFT, supra note 7, at 154.
149 Id. at 164.
150 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 461.
151 See supra Subsection I.A.1.
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market monitor will also impede recovery of fixed costs from the spot
market. Market mitigation cannot be eliminated, however, because the
peculiarities of electricity sometimes create opportunities for generators,
even ones with small market shares, to game the market and profit from
withholding. Instead, FERC should suggest changes to MMMs designed to
minimize transaction costs and the occurrence of false positives. For
instance, market thresholds should take into account the duration of price
spikes and should not use percentage changes in parameters that may
disadvantage small generators. 15 2 Additionally, thresholds should be tied to
the load-generation ratio. As supply (forced and unforced generation)
becomes tighter or as load increases secularly, the thresholds should
increase, and as the ratio decreases the thresholds also should decrease.
Including all installed capacity prevents generators from abusing market
power by increasing the load-generation ratio through withholding. Using
a system's winter or summer peaks rather than cyclical measures of load
preserves the bright-line nature of the thresholds; if the measure of load
changed too frequently, generators would be uncertain about what bids
surpass the thresholds and, as a result, would not always submit bids
reflecting scarcity.
Even if changes in MMMs are not the solution, market mitigation's
effect on scarcity prices is likely much smaller than that of a $1000/MWh
price cap. Market mitigation is not blindly applied and instead responds to
competitive justifications for price spikes. Also, in addition to false
positives, false negatives will occur when screening market-power abuses;
revenues from false negatives may offset the effects false positives have
on scarcity prices. Last, all capacity markets to date have included either
price caps or market mitigation, so whether a capacity requirement
remedies price caps' and market mitigation's deleterious effects on
scarcity pricing is unclear.
FERC's final concern is that spot prices will not signal the need for
generation with sufficient lead time to construct new generation.,
53
FERC's worry, however, may be a bit anachronistic. 54 Merchant
generators have discovered how to reduce the lag in bringing new
generation online by relocating already constructed combustion turbines.
Also, to the extent that the lag is a symptom of merchant generators'
inexperience in interpreting trends in spot prices, over time they should
152 See James F. Wilson, The New York ISO's Market Power Screens, Thresholds, and
Mitigation: Why It Is Not a Model, ELECTRICITY J., Aug.-Sept. 2000, at 25-27 (claiming that the
NYISO's percentage thresholds disadvantage small generators, who are likely to trigger the percentage
thresholds by taking inconsequential amounts of generation offline when larger generators would not
trigger the percentage thresholds at such low quantities). Thresholds measured in terms of megawatts
and megawatt-hours would not raise the same concerns.
153 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 461.
154 See supra Subsection I.A.2; sources cited supra note 36.
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become more adept at anticipating load growth. Even if my view proves
overly optimistic, uncertainty due to the infancy of competitive electricity
markets would also hinder generators' ability to estimate the revenues
generated by capacity committed three years before the spot market is run.
Although central decision-makers such as the ITPs project load growth,
they hold no apparent advantage over merchant generators at predicting
that far ahead. What's more, the RAR currently relies on short-term prices




Even apart from price caps, market mitigation, and lead times,
regulatory intervention may still be necessary in a VOLL price-cap regime
to ensure that LSEs have adequate operating reserves. During an overall
shortage, LSEs have an incentive to free ride on other LSEs that have
obtained adequate or more than adequate operating reserves, especially if
ITPs do not control the circuit equipment needed to curtail deficient LSEs.
To solve such a market failure, the ITP could require LSEs to satisfy a
particular reserve margin. Since many factors, ranging from the type of
generation in a region to transmission constraints,' 56 determine the ideal
level of operating reserves, permitting LSEs to choose their own level
should prove more efficient than mandating a uniform reserve margin. Not
surprisingly, market simulations under a variety of scenarios indicate that
centralized determinations of operating reserves are often suboptimal
compared to a competitive solution coupled with a small amount of
demand response. 157
Still, to prevent deficient LSEs from free-riding on LSEs with
adequate reserves, LSEs must be forced to internalize the costs of their
behavior. In the case of an overall shortage, ITPs should order deficient
LSEs to curtail their load. If the LSEs disobey the ITPs' directive, they
would be fined the VOLL plus any transaction costs the LSEs' violation
imposed on the system. Having to pay the VOLL plus the relevant
transaction costs would force a deficient LSE to internalize the social costs
of its conduct, and if the LSEs that had adequate reserves but nonetheless
155 Under the RAR, an LSE may cure its resource deficiency two days ahead, a week ahead,
a month ahead, or at any other point before the day-ahead spot market is run. Therefore short-term
prices with respect to RAR do not include the day-ahead spot price or the ancillary-services price.
156 Remedying Undue Discrimination, supra note 3, 111 489-90, 496.
157 STAN HADLEY & ERIC HIRST, MAINTAINING GENERATION ADEQUACY IN A
RESTRUCTURING U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 48-49 (Oak Ridge Nat'l Lab. Paper, ORNL/CON-472,
Oct. 1999). See also STOFT, supra note 7, at 182 n.2 ("Why should the cost-minimizing value of load
shedding equal the time it takes the earth to rotate once times the number of digits on two hands
divided by the time it takes the earth to orbit the sun?").
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had to curtail were paid the VOLL, that should lead to the socially efficient
result. An LSE that faces a fine equal to the social costs of failing to plan
adequately will have the incentive to take into account every consideration
relevant to setting its reserve margin, without being tempted to free-ride
inefficiently on other LSEs' resources.
3. Better Than RAR, But Not First Best
Although a market with a VOLL price cap will yield a more efficient
level of resource adequacy than a centralized decision-maker would
produce, if some load is not paying RTPs and therefore cannot respond to
price fluctuations, the resulting level of capacity will still not be first
best.' 58 Borenstein & Holland's market modeling demonstrates that
increasing the proportion of load that pays RTPs will increase market
efficiency.159 But the optimal level of capacity could still be higher or
lower than what such a market provides.
Whether capacity would expand or contract as more demand responds
to RTPs depends on the relative elasticities of RTP demand at peak and
off-peak points. 60 RTP demand is lower than flat-rate demand at peak
prices and higher at off-peak prices, since RTP demand responds to
changes in price. If RTP demand is sufficiently more elastic at peak points
than at non-peak points, then capacity should contract as demand response
increases: The increased demand at non-peak times will still be less than
the capacity that was built to serve non-RTP peak demand. If RTP demand
is not sufficiently more elastic at peak points compared to non-peak points,
then capacity should expand:'16 Increased demand at non-peak times will
158 SEVERIN BORENSTEIN & STEPHEN P. HOLLAND, INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY IN
COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS WITH AND WITHOUT TIME-VARYING RETAIL PRICES (Ctr. for
the Study of Energy Mkts., Univ. of Cal. Energy Inst., Working Paper No. 106, Nov. 2002). Note the
difference between claiming that a price-spike market will not yield first-best capacity and claiming
that it will not yield adequate capacity. All that is needed for a price-spike market to provide adequate
capacity is "a very small fraction" of load that responds "to real-time prices." HADLEY & HIRST, supra
note 157, at 49. See also STOFT, supra note 7, at 143 (concluding that reducing total demand as little as
2% in response to price spikes may be enough to produce a long-run market equilibrium). First-best
capacity, in contrast, is what the market would choose if all load paid RTPs (i.e., if demand response
were universal).
159 BORENSTEIN & HOLLAND, supra note 158, at 25.
160 Id.
161 This point can also be made in terms of different quantities of RTP load that share the
same elasticity. Assume the RTP load level X decreases consumption at the peak price relative to lower
prices but does not increase consumption at the non-peak price enough to exceed generation's level of
capacity. At some point as RTP load increases beyond level X, the increase in consumption at the non-
peak price exceeds available capacity, while consumption at the peak price does not. Generators
decrease the peak price and raise the non-peak price. Depending on the relative magnitude of these
changes, profits may increase and lead to an increase in generation capacity. Id. at 21-22, 30, fig.7.
464
Vol. 20:431, 2003
RAR in FERC's Standard Market Design
more than offset the decrease at peak times and exceed the generation
capacity previously available.
6 2
In the end, although a price-spike market may not result in first-best
capacity, regulatory attempts to tweak capacity through subsidies (such as
ICAP) or reserve margins perform even worse relative to the first-best
level of capacity. 16' The result is more intuitive if capacity payments to
generators are characterized as a "tax" on load and a capacity "subsidy" to
generators. The constant "tax" that consumers pay throughout peak and
non-peak periods distorts the effects of supply conditions164 to which RTP
demand should be responding. In other words, the distortions regulators
create when attempting to solve distortions caused by flat-rate pricing
leave load worse off overall when some of that load is paying RTPs.
65
Conclusion
The surest road to competitive electricity markets runs through
demand response. Even if RAR accomplishes long-term resource
adequacy, it will provide insufficient incentives for demand response and
will perpetuate a price-cap regime that does the same. At worst, RAR will
collapse under its internal contradictions and fail to provide long-term
resource adequacy. FERC should replace RAR and the current price-cap
regime with a price cap set at VOLL and a penalty equal to VOLL plus the
transaction costs incurred for electricity that deficient LSEs take from the
spot market during an overall shortage. Such reforms would permit the
scarcity price signals needed to spur the development of demand response,
a necessary condition for a viably competitive electricity market.
Update
After this Note went to press, FERC issued a White Paper that
responds to comments on the SMD NOPR and that provides some
indication of the final rule's content.166 FERC seems to recognize that its
claim to have jurisdiction to implement the original RAR is tenuous.
6
1
FERC envisions greater state discretion in developing a resource adequacy
162 Non-peak load may not increase enough to exceed generation capacity if the LSEs have a
reserve margin, but it would at least begin to cut into the reserve margin.
163 Id. at 24-25.
164 Id. at 18.
165 Id. at 24.
166 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, WHITE PAPER: WHOLESALE POWER MARKET
PLATFORM, FERC Docket No. RM01-12-000 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/Electric/RTO/mrkt-strct-comments/discussionpaper.htm (last visited May I,
2003).
167 Id. at5.
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program than its initial proposal allowed168 and has retreated from its plans
to set a minimum reserve margin. 69 Still, FERC is committed to every
state's having some sort of resource adequacy program, and when states do
not implement such a program, FERC would permit the appropriate ISO to
do so. 7° Further, FERC proposes that the Regional State Advisory
Committees ensure consistency among states' resource adequacy
programs,' 7' a delegation of authority that may implicate the FPA's limits
on FERC's jurisdiction. And even though FERC has repudiated a
minimum reserve margin, FERC has not said what will happen to the
RAR's other elements, including the enforcement mechanism and
planning horizon. Regardless of the final rule's content, revamping the
current price-cap regime along the lines outlined in this Note remains the
optimal approach to reforming electricity markets.
168 Id.
169 Id. app. A, at 18.
170 Id. at5.
171 Id. at 11.
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